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Abstract: In this paper we report on a principal-agent experiment where the principal can 
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do not use the fine and that the pure bonus contract is more efficient than the combined 
contract. Our experiment suggests that principals who are less fair are more likely to choose a 
combined contract and less likely to actually pay the announced bonus. This offers a new 
explanation for why explicit and implicit incentives are substitutes rather than complements.  
 
Keywords: moral hazard, bonus contract, implicit incentives, fairness, incentives 
 
JEL numbers: C7, C9, J3 
________________________ 
§ This paper was presented in the session “Contracts and Fairness” at the American Economic Association 
Meetings in Chicago, January 5-7, 2007. We would like to thank our discussant Jeremy Stein for valuable 
comments. Susanne Kremhelmer provided excellent research assistance. Financial Support by Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB-TR 15 and the RTN network ENABLE is gratefully acknowledged. Fehr 
also gratefully acknowledges support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (project number 101312-
103898/1) and the Research Priority Program of the “Foundations of Human Social Behavior” at the University 
of Zürich.  
* Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Bluemlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zurich, 
Switzerland, email: efehr@iew.unizh.ch. 
** Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Bluemlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zurich, 
Switzerland, email: efehr@iew.unizh.ch. 
 
 2
Interaction in small groups is often affected by concerns for fairness and reciprocity. These 
effects have to be taken into account in the design of optimal incentive schemes. In Fehr and 
Schmidt (2004) and Fehr, Alexander Klein and Schmidt (2007, henceforce FKS) we have 
shown experimentally that “bonus contracts” that rely on fairness and trust as an enforcement 
device can be more efficient and more profitable than “incentive contracts” that are enforced 
by the courts. In the current paper we consider contracts that combine a voluntary bonus with 
enforceable incentive payments. The question is whether the combination of these two 
instruments improves efficiency or whether the use of explicit incentives undermines the 
functioning of implicit incentives such as voluntary bonus payments.  
Voluntary bonus payments are frequently used in situations where the principal and the 
agent both observe some aspects of the agent’s performance, but where it is impossible to 
contract explicitly on this information because it is not verifiable to the courts.  In a one-shot 
relationship a purely self-interested principal would never pay the bonus and thus the agent 
would have no incentive to work. However, our previous experiments (FKS 2007, Fehr and 
Schmidt 2004) show that many principals make substantial voluntary bonus payments, even if 
the interaction with the agent is one-shot and completely anonymous. The agents anticipate 
this, and many of them choose high levels of effort.   
In our previous experiments the principals were restricted to use either a bonus contract 
or an incentive contract. With an incentive contract the principal could impose a fine on the 
agent for spending too little effort. However, the fine was bounded, so the incentive contract 
could not be used to implement the first best efficient effort level. More than 80 percent of the 
principals preferred the bonus contract, which also was significantly more profitable and 
efficient.  
In this paper we report on an experiment in which the principal could combine the two 
instruments.  At first glance it seems that a combined contract that uses both, a voluntary 
bonus payment and a fine, should always dominate. First of all, it is more general and gives 
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more options to the principal than the pure bonus and the pure incentive contracts. Second, 
adding a stick (the explicit incentive) to the carrot (the voluntary bonus) should improve 
incentives in particular for those agents who worked too little with a pure bonus contract. 
However, in our experiment the combined contracts did not induce the agents to work harder, 
and two thirds of the principals preferred a pure bonus over a combined contract. Our 
experiment suggests that principals who are less fair are more likely to choose a combined 
contract and less likely to actually pay the announced bonus. This offers a new explanation 
for why explicit and implicit incentives are substitutes rather than complements.  
 
I. The Principal-Agent Experiment 
We use exactly the same framework as in FKS but allow for different contracts. There is a 
principal who hires an agent to carry out production. The agent has to choose an effort level 
{ }1,...,10e∈  which induces gross profit v=10 e⋅  for the principal. Effort is costly to the agent 
with effort costs given by Table I. Note that the efficient effort level is e=10 which generates 
a net surplus of 80. 
TABLE I: THE AGENT’S EFFORT COST FUNCTION 
e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 13 16 20 
 
Gross profits and effort costs cannot be contracted upon. Both parties observe the agent’s 
effort level, but in order to contract on effort, it has to be verified by the courts. At date 0, 
before the agent chooses e , the principal can invest in a verification technology at a fixed cost 
10k =  that permits partial verification of effort. If the principal invested k and required the 
agent to work at least *e , then with probability p=1/3  the courts observe whether *e e≥  or 
*e e< . The principal can impose a fine on the agent if shirking ( *)e e≤  has been verified, 
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but the fine is bounded by 13f ≤ . Thus, if the agent is not too risk averse, * 4e =  is the 
highest incentive compatible effort level.1  
In this contractual environment we consider two types of contracts: 
• Pure Bonus Contract (BC): The principal offers a contract (w,e*,b*) that stipulates an 
unconditional base wage w and asks the agent to expend effort e*>1. Furthermore, the 
principal announces that she may pay a bonus b*.  However, neither the agent’s effort nor the 
principal’s bonus payment is enforceable. After observing the agent’s effort the principal 
chooses the actual bonus b ≥ 0. Thus, monetary payoffs are ( )AM w c e b= − +  for the agent 
and 10PM e w b= − −  for the principal. 
• Combined Contract (CC): The principal invests in the verification technology at cost 
10k =  and offers a contract ( , *, , *)w e f b  that stipulates a wage w, a demanded effort level 
e*, and a fine f to be paid in case shirking (e<e*) is verified. Furthermore, the principal 
announces a possible bonus payment *b . Again the bonus is voluntary and the principal can 
choose any b ≥ 0. Expected payoffs are 
 
( ) * 10 *
and1 1( ) * 10 *
3 3
A P
w c e b if e e e w b k if e e
M M
w c e b f if e e e w b f k if e e
− + ≥ − − − ≥⎧ ⎧⎪ ⎪= =⎨ ⎨− + − < − − + − <⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎩
 
Note that the combined contract is more general than the pure bonus contract because it 
adds the additional instrument of imposing a fine if the agent shirks. On the other hand, it 
requires a cost of 10 for the verification technology. This cost is a plausible feature of real 
world contracts that rely on third party verification and enforcement.  Note further that from 
the perspective of traditional contract theory the announcement of a voluntary bonus payment 
should not affect the agent’s effort choice. In a one-shot relationship a rational and self-
interested principal will never pay a bonus which should be anticipated by a rational agent. 
                                                 
1 A self-interested agent prefers to work e=4 at an effort cost of 4 rather than to shirk (e=1), incur an effort cost 
of 0 and an expected fine of 4.3. If the principal requires the agent to choose e*=5, however, the agent prefers to 
incur the expected fine of 4.3 rather than to incur the effort cost c(5)=6.  
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However, FKS (2007) have shown that some principals make substantial bonus payments 
which induces the agents to work significantly more than if a pure incentive contract is 
offered (that relies only on the fine).  
We conducted the experiments in Munich in three sessions, each with 22-24 subjects 
randomly assigned to the roles of the principal and the agent. Each session had ten periods. 
Each agent was matched with a different anonymous principal in each period so that no agent 
interacted more than once with the same principal. Thus, we had ten contracts with ten 
different contracting partners for each subject in each experimental session.2 
 
II. Experimental Results 
Slightly more than two thirds of all contract offers (229 of 339, 67.6 percent) are pure bonus 
contracts and less than one third are combined contracts. Figure 1 shows that there is a slowly 
increasing trend in favor of the pure bonus contract that peaks in period 10 at a share of 
roughly 75 percent. Thus, the clear majority of principals voluntarily forgo the opportunity to 
use the fine.  
                                                 
2 A more detailed description of the experimental procedures, a complete set of the instructions and the data can 
be found at http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/ls_schmidt/research/supplements/stickcarrot/index.htm   
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FIGURE 1: SHARE OF PURE BONUS AND COMBINED CONTRACTS  
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The combined contracts did not induce significantly higher effort levels. The average 
effort is 5.4 in the combined contracts and 5.1 in the pure bonus contracts, but this difference 
is statistically not significant (p>0.45, Mann Whitney test) and not sufficient to outweigh the 
verification cost for the explicit incentive. In fact, the principal’s average payoff from offering 
a pure bonus contract is 24.7 while her payoff is 24.0 if she offered a combined contract. 
Again, this difference is not statistically significant (p > 0.99 Mann Whitney test).3 The 
agents’ payoffs are significantly higher if a pure bonus contract is offered. On average, their 
income is 19.2 in the pure bonus contracts and 12.5 in the combined contracts.4 Furthermore, 
the bonus contracts are rejected less often than combined contracts (2.2 percent vs. 7.3 
percent) and they do not require the costly verification technology. For these reasons bonus 
contracts are more efficient. If a bonus contract is offered, the average surplus is 43.9 tokens 
which is significantly higher (p = 0.0012, Mann Whitney test) than the surplus of 36.5 tokens 
generated if a combined contract is offered.  
                                                 
3 Principals’ profits from combined contracts exhibit considerably higher volatility. The standard deviation of the 
principals’ payoffs in the combined contract is 26.8 while in the pure bonus contract it is only 23.7. 
4 This difference is significant (p < 0.001) according to a Mann Whitney test. 
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Why is the additional incentive instrument of the fine ineffective? Figure 2 shows that 
the average bonus that the principals paid for any given level of effort is much lower for the 
combined contracts than for the pure bonus contracts. The dark dots show the average bonus 
that is paid under a pure bonus contract for any given level of effort. The figure shows that the 
bonus is strongly increasing with effort. In fact this relationship is very similar to the bonus-
effort relationship observed for pure bonus contracts in FKS (2007). The light dots show the 
average bonus that is paid under a combined contract for any given effort level. 
FIGURE 2: AVERAGE BONUS PAYMENTS CONDITIONAL ON EFFORT  
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Table 2 reports multivariate regressions to better understand what determines the 
actual bonus payments. Regressions (1) and (2) look at the data of pure bonus contracts and 
combined contracts separately. In both regressions the agent’s effort is highly significant. 
However, the coefficient of effort in the pure bonus contracts is twice as high as the 
coefficient of effort in the combined contracts. The demanded effort *e  and the announced 
bonus *b  have no significant effect and seem to be cheap talk. The wage w  has a small 
negative effect suggesting that the bonus payment is smaller the larger the wage that has been 
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paid upfront. The effect of the fine used in the combined contract is not significant. 
Regression (3) pools the data and adds an additional variable, namely the total number of 
combined contracts that individual principals offered over the 10 periods of the experiment. 
This variable is highly significant. It suggests that a principal who always used a pure bonus 
contract pays an average bonus that is 10 tokens higher than a principal who always used a 
combined contract. A closer look at the data reveals that there are in fact different types of 
principals. 56 percent of the principals (19 of 34) chose the bonus contract in at least eight out 
of ten periods. 15 percent of the principals (5 of 34) chose the combined contract in at least 
eight periods. Regression (4) adds dummy variables for these two types of principals that are 
highly significant. On average the principals who predominantly choose the combined 
contract pay eight tokens less than those who predominantly choose the pure bonus contract.  
TABLE 2 - DETERMINANTS OF BONUS PAYMENTS 
Dependent 
variable: 
Bonus 
payments 
(1) 
pure 
bonus 
contracts 
(2) 
combined 
contracts 
 
(3) 
all 
contracts 
 
(4) 
all 
contracts 
 
Constant -3.21 
(2.43) 
- 9.56 
(4.46) 
0.45** 
(2.39) 
-4.59** 
(1.95) 
Effort 3.03*** 
(0.25) 
1.59*** 
(0.37) 
2.52*** 
(0.24) 
2.53*** 
(0.14) 
Demanded 
effort 
0.19 
(0.38) 
0.96 
(0.80) 
0.46 
(0.33) 
0.51 
(0.33) 
wage -0.18** 
(0.07) 
-0.27* 
(0.17) 
-0.27*** 
(0.06) 
-0.26*** 
(0.07) 
Announced 
bonus 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
Fine  0.30 
(0.26) 
  
Number of 
CCs by 
principal 
  -0.98*** 
(0.23) 
 
Dummy for 
BC-principals 
   3.52*** 
(1.00) 
Dummy for 
CC-principals 
   -4.21*** 
(1.39) 
No. of 
observations 
224 102 326 326 
R2 0.64 0.35 0.58 0.56 
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Table reports the coefficients from OLS regressions. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. BC-
principals (CC-principals) chose the bonus contract 
(combined contract) at least eight times. In all regressions we 
clustered on individual principals. 
 
III. Interpretation of the Results 
One might have expected that the additional instrument of a fine would induce the agent to 
spend more effort, but this is not the case in our experiments. It turns out that the explicit 
incentive of the fine and the implicit promise of a bonus payment are substitutes rather than 
complements. How can this be explained? Several experimental and field studies have shown 
that the use of explicit incentives, in particular the use of punishments and fines, may crowd 
out intrinsic motivation (see Bruno S. Frey, 1997, and Frey and Reto Jegen, 2001, surveys), 
and several theoretical arguments have been suggested to explain this phenomenon. However, 
most of these arguments do not apply to our experiments. First, in our experiments the agent’s 
task is just to pick a number at a monetary cost, so it is hard to argue that this task is so 
interesting that the agent wants to choose a positive effort level without explicit incentives (as 
argued by Frey and Jegen, 2001). Second, the pure bonus contract and the combined contract 
both use monetary incentives, so the agents’ behavior cannot be explained as a reaction to the 
introduction of money (as in Frey, 1997, Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rusticini, 2000a and 2000b, or 
Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole, 2006). Third, the task is very simple and the fine is tailored 
to performance, so explicit incentives do not distort the agent’s effort (as in Bengt Holmström 
and Paul Milgrom, 1989, and David M. Kreps, 1997). Forth, the principal and the agent are 
symmetrically informed in the experiment. Thus, the principal’s contract choice cannot signal 
the difficulty of the task (as in Bénabou and Tirole, 2003) or the social norm (as in Dirk 
Sliwka, 2006) to the agent. Finally, the interaction is one-shot, so the principal has no 
incentive to signal to agent that he trusts him in order to induce the agent to work harder in a 
second relationship (as in Florian Herold, 2004).  
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There are two explanations that may apply to our experiments. First, as argued by Fehr 
and John List (2004) the explicit threat of using a sanction may be seen as a hostile act to 
which the agent reciprocates by choosing a lower level of effort.5 Second, in our experiments 
the contract offer may have been a signal about the principal’s trustworthiness. Recall that the 
principal moves twice. He offers a contract to the agent at date 0, and he decides on his bonus 
payment at date 2. If the agent does not know whether the principal is a fair or selfish type, he 
will try to infer from the contract offer how much bonus the principal is going to pay.  The 
principals who predominantly offered the complete contract made significantly lower bonus 
payments than the principals who predominantly used the bonus contract. If the agents 
understand this, they should expect lower bonus payments if a complete contract is offered 
and therefore work less. The principal’s monetary payoff is the same under a pure bonus and a 
combined contract. Thus, a selfish principal has no incentive to mimic the behavior of a fair 
principal.  
Thus, the use of a fine conveys has the direct effect to induce the agent to work more, 
but it also signals that the principal is more selfish and less likely to make a generous bonus 
payment. On balance, these two effects seem to just cancel out. However, the exact 
interaction of exThis is a new interpretation for why the additional explicit incentive of a fine 
is ineffective.  
 
                                                 
5 Fehr and List (2004) and Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) consider trust games in which the principal could 
commit ex ante to punish the agent if the agent chooses to return less than the desired amount. Similarly, Armin 
Falk and Michael Kosfeld (2006) consider a gift exchange game in which the principal can restrict the action set 
of the agent and thus force the agent to choose at least an effort level 0e > . These experiments have shown that 
controlling the agent by threatening to impose a fine or by restricting his action space reduces the agent’s effort.  
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